# Preservation of Integrity Constraints by Workflow: Online Appendix

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This is an online appendix to our paper [3] (referred to as the conference paper in the following). The online appendix includes the complete formalism for transition system semantics of GSM partially and informally given the conference paper. This semantics is then compared with existing operational semantics of GSM. The proof to the main theorem in the paper the conference paper is also provided. Finally, the constraints and injections of full case study of EzMart is given.

# 1 Operation schema

The action requesting ASC to send a message m is denoted by !m.

Given a GSM workflow model AP, the execution model of AP is a transition system, denoted by  $TS_{AP}$ . The state space is a set of all "snapshots" of artifacts. It is specified by the construct STATE in Z notation, where the set of all artifact classes in AP is  $\mathbf{A} = \{\alpha_i \mid i \in 1...n\}$ ; each artifact class  $\alpha_i$  is represented in state space as a table consisting the artifact ID, the data attribute value, and stage and milestone status. XOp is the finite set of signatures of possible next operations, where OPSIG is the type of operation signatures; eq and eq are two queues of external events and control events, resp., where ExtEv and IntEv are respectively the type of external events and control (internal) events; eq and eq are two operations triggered by the head event in eq and eq, resp.

Full state space schema:

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```
STATE
\alpha_1(ID, x, y, ...) : ArtifactClass
\alpha_2(..., s, m, ...) : ArtifactClass
\vdots
\alpha_n(...) : ArtifactClass
XOp : \mathbb{F} OPSIG
eq : seq ExtEv
cq : seq IntEv
het, hct : \mathbb{F} OPER
```

Given a stage S and a milestone m, we use S. sentry to denote the guard sentry of S and  $m^+$ . sentry (resp.  $m^-$ . sentry) to denote the achieving (resp. invalidating) sentry of the m, S. MS to denote the milestones associated with S, S. Body to denote the defined actions in the body of S, S. creatInst:  $\mathbb B$  to indicate whether the stage S is for creating a new artifact instance, CEv(S.sentry) and EEv(S.sentry) to denote respectively the set of control event and external event used in S. sentry (the similar notation applies to milestones), and action SKIP to be the short form for x := x, denoting no change to any state observables. And given a GSM specification AP, Ev(AP) denotes the set of all events used in the workflow schema.

Given a artifact class  $\alpha$  and artifact instance ID aid,  $\alpha(aid)$  is short for the selection  $\sigma_{id=aid}\alpha$ , and  $\alpha(aid).x$  denote the projection onto x. Given a stage s or milestone m,  $s^+$ ,  $m^+$ ,  $s^-$  and  $m^-$  denote control event of s.open(), m.achieved(), s.closed() and m.invalidated(). And  $s^+(\alpha,aid)$  denotes the constructor of the control event with artifact class and artifact ID.

We assume to have function newid(): ID generating a new unique id by some id-generator, and function  $sequence(T): \operatorname{seq} T$  takes a finite set T and returns a sequence consisting of all elements in T without repetition with arbitrary order. And in Z notation, symbol  $\langle i,t,e,\ldots \rangle$  denotes sequences of items  $i,t,e,\ldots$  and  $s \cap q$  denotes concatenation of two sequence s and q.

```
init
(\alpha_i = \text{ empty table } | \ 1 \le i \le n); \ iq = \langle \ \rangle; \ cq = \langle \ \rangle
XOp = \{op : Open(\mathtt{S}) \mid \mathtt{S} \in \mathtt{S} \land creatInst(\mathtt{S}) = \mathtt{TRUE}\}
het = \varnothing; \ hct = \varnothing
```

In  $TS_{AP}$ , each operation is identified by its signature which is the operation name and two arguments: stage or milestone name and an optional artifact ID (can omit only for *Open* operation of a create-instance stage, see below). There are three areas in operation specifications, separated by horizontal lines. The first area is for local variable declaration. The second area is the operation guard which is a vertical list of first order formulas. These formulas are connected in conjunction to specify the enabling condition of the transition, i.e. the operation guard. Given an operation op, its guard is denoted by guard(op). The third area is the operation actions for state changes. The changes are given in the form of assignments. Any state variable, artifact attributes and status of

stages and milestones not listed in the actions keep unchanged from the current state to the next state. We then explain the six operation types in detail in below.

```
Open(s:S)
                                                                            .Open(s:S, aid:ID)
\alpha : A where S \in S(\alpha)
                                                                           \alpha : A where S \in S(\alpha)
new : \alpha where
                                                                           mce = \{ \mathsf{m}^-(\alpha, aid) \mid \mathsf{m} \in \mathsf{s}.MS \land 
                                                                                   \mathsf{m}^- \in Ev(AP) \land \alpha(aid).\mathsf{m} = \mathsf{TRUE}
    new.id = newid() \land new.s = TRUE \land
     (\forall \, \mathsf{st} : S(\alpha) - \{\mathsf{s}\} \cdot new.\mathsf{st} = \mathtt{FALSE}) \land 
                                                                           cqm = sequence(mce)
     (\forall \, \mathsf{ms} : M(\alpha) \cdot new.\mathsf{ms} = \mathsf{FALSE})
                                                                           cqs = if \ s^+ \in Ev(AP) \ then \langle s^+(\alpha, aid) \rangle
cqs = \mathbf{if} \ \mathsf{S}^+ \in Ev(AP) \ \mathbf{then} \ \langle \mathsf{S}^+(\alpha, aid) \rangle
                                                                                     else \langle \ \rangle
          else \langle \ \rangle
                                                                           s.creatInst = FALSE
s.creatInst = TRUE
                                                                           Open(s, aid) \in XOp
Open(s) \in XOp
                                                                           \alpha(aid).s \not\in het \cup hct
\forall id : ID \cdot \alpha(id).s \notin het \cup hct
                                                                           \forall \beta : \mathbf{A}; id : \beta.ID; \mathsf{t} : S(\beta).
\forall \beta : \mathbf{A}; id : \beta.ID; \mathsf{t} : S(\beta).
                                                                                \beta(id).t = FALSE
                                                                           s.sentry(A, eq, cq)
     \beta(id).t = FALSE
s.sentry(A, eq, cq)
                                                                           \alpha(aid).s := TRUE
\alpha := \alpha \cup \{new\}
                                                                           \forall \, \mathsf{m} : \mathsf{s}.\mathit{MS} \cdot \alpha(\mathit{aid}).\mathsf{m} := \mathsf{FALSE}
XOp := (XOp - \{Open(s)\}) \cup
                                                                           XOp := (XOp - \{Open(s)\}) \cup
                  \{Body(s, new.id)\}
                                                                                              \{Body(s, aid)\}
cq := cq \cap cqs
                                                                           cq := cq \cap cqs
het := \mathbf{if} \ EEv(s.sentry) = \emptyset
                                                                           het := \mathbf{if} \ EEv(s.sentry) = \emptyset
          then het \cup \{new.s\} else het
                                                                                      then het \cup \{\alpha(aid).s\} else het
hct := if \ CEv(s.sentry) = \emptyset
                                                                           hct := \mathbf{if} \ CEv(\mathbf{s}.sentry) = \emptyset
          then hct \cup \{new.s\} else hct
                                                                                      then hct \cup \{\alpha(aid).s\} else hct
```

Fig. 1: Operations: Part 1 – stage open with or without instance creation

Here we fist give the informal description of operations:

- Open is responsible to handling stage opening. Given a stage S, the guard of the operation requires: the operation signature is in XOp; the same external event or control event can only be used to open each S once; there is only one stage being open at the same time, and the sentry of the stage guard evaluates true under current artifact attribute valuations and events in eq and cq. When the operation guard is satisfied, the stage is open and all of its milestones are invalidated. Status and control event queues are updated accordingly. And if the stage is triggered by some external or control event heads in the corresponding queue, such stage is added into het or hct, resp. Also the Body of the stage is put in XOp, and the current operation is removed from XOp.
- AchieveClose specifies how a milestone is achieved and thus close the stage. Given
  a milestone m and its belonging stage s, the operation guard is satisfied when the
  operation signature is in XOp, milestone m and stage s of the artifact is not achieved

```
AchieveClose(m, aid)
                                                                              Invalid(m, aid)
\alpha : \mathbf{A} \text{ where } \mathbf{m} \in M(\alpha)
                                                                              \alpha : \mathbf{A} \text{ where } \mathbf{m} \in M(\alpha)
s : S(\alpha) where m \in s.MS
                                                                              s : S(\alpha) where m \in s.MS
cqm = if m^+ \in Ev(AP) then \langle m^+(\alpha, aid) \rangle else \langle \rangle
                                                                              cqm = \mathbf{if} \ \mathbf{m}^- \in Ev(AP)
cqs = \mathbf{if} \ \mathbf{S}^- \in Ev(AP) \ \mathbf{then} \ \langle \mathbf{S}^-(\alpha, aid) \rangle \ \mathbf{else} \ \langle \ \rangle
                                                                                        then \langle \mathsf{m}^-(\alpha, aid) \rangle else \langle \rangle
AchieveClose(m, aid) \in XOp
                                                                              Invalid(m, aid) \in XOp
\alpha(aid).m = FALSE
                                                                              \alpha(aid).m = TRUE
\alpha(aid).s = TRUE
                                                                              \alpha(aid).m \not\in het \cup hct
\alpha(aid).\mathsf{m} \not\in het \cup hct
                                                                              m^-.sentry(A, eq, cq)
m^+.sentry(A, eq, cq)
                                                                              \alpha(aid).m := FALSE
\alpha(aid).m := TRUE
                                                                              XOp := XOp - \{Invalid(m, aid)\}
\alpha(aid).s := FALSE
                                                                              cq := cq \cap cqm
XOp := (XOp - \{AchieveClose(m, aid)\}) \cup
                                                                              het := if \ EEv(m^-.sentry) = \emptyset
    if s.creatInst then {Invalid(m, aid), Open(s)}
                                                                                       then het \cup \{\alpha(aid).m\}
    else \{Invalid(m, aid), Open(s, aid)\}
                                                                                        else het
cq := cq \cap cqm \cap cqs
                                                                              hct := if \ CEv(m^-.sentry) = \emptyset
if EEv(m^+.sentry) \neq \emptyset \land m uses the event to set x
                                                                                        then hct \cup \{\alpha(aid).m\}
then \alpha(aid).x := head \, eq \, else \, SKIP
                                                                                        else hct
het := if \ EEv(m^+.sentry) = \emptyset
         then het \cup \{\alpha(aid).m\} else het
hct := if \ CEv(m^+.sentry) = \emptyset
         then hct \cup \{\alpha(aid).m\} else hct
```

Fig. 2: Operations: Part 2 – milestone achieving (with stage close) and invalidating

and open, resp., current external and control events are not used to achieve or invalidate the milestone, and the milestone sentry is evaluated true under current artifacts and events in *eq* and *cq*. When the operation guard is satisfied, m is marked as achieved and s is closed. Event queues and *hct* and *het* are updated accordingly (like in *Open*). The *Open* operation of the belonging stage and *Invalid* operation of this milestone is added to *XOp* and the current operation is removed from *XOp*.

- Invalid specifies the operation to invalidate a milestone. Given a milestone m, the operation guard is satisfied when the operation signature is in XOp, milestone m is already achieved, current external and control events are not used to achieve or invalidate the milestone, and the milestone sentry is evaluated true under current artifacts and events in eq and cq. When the operation guard is satisfied, m is marked as not achieved. Event queues and hct and het are updated accordingly (like in Open). The current operation is removed from XOp and no new operation is added.
- Body takes action according to the definition of the stage body. As for the guard, it requires the corresponding stage to be open, and the milestone to be not achieved.
   Other than following the stage body, this operation also put *AchieveClose* of the milestones of the stage in *XOp* while the current operation is removed.
- Operation DeEQ and DeCQ specifies how events are removed from eq and cq, resp.
   These operations do not require to be exists in XOp but can only be enabled when

```
Body(s, aid)
\alpha : \mathbf{A} \text{ where } \mathbf{S} \in S(\alpha)
                                                                              \forall op : XOp \blacksquare \neg guard(op)
Body(s, aid) \in XOp
                                                                              cq \neq \langle \rangle
\alpha(aid).s = TRUE
                                                                              hct \neq \emptyset
\forall \, \mathsf{m} : \mathsf{s}.\mathit{MS} \, \mathbf{.} \, \neg \, \alpha(\mathit{aid}).\mathsf{m}
                                                                              cq := tail cq
if s.body is sending msg
                                                                              hct := \emptyset
then msg! else SKIP
                                                                              DeEQ_
if s.body is assigning x by exp
                                                                             \forall op : XOp \cup \{DeCQ\} \cdot \neg guard(op)
then \forall x_i : \mathbf{x} \cdot \alpha(aid).x_i = exp_i
else SKIP
                                                                             eq \neq \langle \rangle
XOp := (XOp - \{Body(s, aid)\}) \cup
                                                                             eq := tail eq
              \{AchievClose(m.aid) \mid m \in s.MS\}
                                                                             het := \emptyset
```

Fig. 3: Operations: Part 3 – stage body and dequeue

all operations in XOp cannot be enabled. Furthermore, the head control event can only be removed when it is used to trigger some stage or milestone; and DeEQ can only be enabled when DeCQ cannot be enabled.

For operation *Open*, see Figure 1; for *AchieveClose* and *Invalid*, see Figure 2; and for *Body*, *DeEQ* and *DeCQ*, see Figure 3.

## 2 Comparison with existing semantics

The execution model given in [3] is analogous to the incremental semantics in [2]. Although we do not rigidly follow their semantics using PAC rules and B-steps (see [2]), we follow their intuitions; and a sequence of execution between two immediate external even dequeue operations (DeEQ) has the same effect as a macro-B-step (sequence of B-steps between handling two incoming events, see [2]). While [1] and [2] focus on GSM itself and equivalence among different semantic models, we detail the management of event queues, operation enabling conditions (guard) and state updates. In out model, enabling of one operation depends only on the current state. Our model is more suitable in analysis and control of the execution. As a result the transition system introduced in this section can help better in understanding when and where the integrity constraints can be violated, and how to prevent such violation.

Focusing on the the fundamental structure of GSM and problem of ensuring data integrity, we overlook some complex features of GSM models and assume all GSM specifications studied in this paper satisfy the following properties.

- 1. Only atomic stages are used because only such stages are responsible for task invocation and artifact value update.
- 2. Each sentry is defined using only the artifact attributes with at most one external and control event. That is, stage and milestone status is not used in sentries. This saves us from building and following dependency graphs as in [2].

3. The event takes its immediate effect (on attribute value) only when it is used as a triggering reply event of a milestone. Triggering event of stages are instead used in the assignments in the stage body.

The execution model introduced can be extended to support the GSM model without these assumptions. But the extension is out of the scope of this paper.

## 3 Notations in SUB and proof of Theorem 1 in [3]

Some notations used in the function SUB in Section 4.2 of [3] to make it more concise. Here we give their definitions:

- When the stage writes attributes of another artifact, say  $\beta(bid)$ , then the constraint on  $\beta$ .x is only required to hold on artifacts of  $\beta$  reference by attribute  $\alpha(aid).bid$ . Therefore such reference dependencies should be added into the premises by function  $explicitref(\kappa)$  under the following procedure.
  - For each  $v \in WriteSet(S)$  of the form  $\beta_1(\cdots(\beta_{k-1}(\beta_k(bid_k).bid_{k-1}).\cdots).bid_1).x$  where  $\beta_k = \alpha$ ,  $bid_k = aid$ , and  $\beta_1.x \in CA(\kappa)$ , add all  $bid_i$  and other free attributes of  $\beta_i$  ( $1 \le i \le k$ ) as  $\forall$ -quantified variable, and connect  $\beta_i(bid_i, bid_{i-1}, \ldots)$  in conjunction with the premises (the dots represents all other attributes of  $\beta_{i_1}$ ).
- Notation  $con[\exp/\alpha(id).\mathbf{x}]$  denotes using each exp in  $\exp$  s.t. x := exp (x is in  $\mathbf{x}$ ) appears in the body of the stage to substitute simultaneously in con for
  - every  $\forall$ -quantified variable y that appears in the column of  $\alpha.x$  in the relation atom  $\alpha$  identified by id, and remove such y from the  $\forall$ -quantified variable list of con;
  - every  $\exists$ -quantified variable z in the column of  $\alpha.x$  in the relation atom  $\alpha$  identified by id (which must be in the consequent), and remove such z from the  $\exists$ -quantified variable list of con; and
  - if a constant c appears in the column of  $\alpha.x$  in the relation atom  $\alpha$  identified by id in the premises (resp. consequent), conjunct c = exp withe premises (resp. consequent).
- Similar notation con[e/x] in the if-clause denotes the substitution of e for x in con, and: if x is an ID, remove it from the  $\forall$ -quantified variable list of con; if x is an artifact relation, remove all variables appear in it from the  $\forall$ -quantified variable list of con.

#### Proof sketch of Theorem 1 in [3].

**Theorem**. Given GSM specification AP and the set of integrity constraints K, the transition system with injection,  $InjTS_{AP}$ , is both sound and conservative complete.

*Proof (Sketch)* The *soundness* can be proved as following. Because  $TS_{AP}$  and  $InjTS_{AP}$  share the same initial state and no artifact exists on the initial state, no constraints are violated on the initial state. Assume an arbitrary constraint  $\kappa$  holds on an arbitrary state s of a run  $\rho'$  of  $InjTS_{AP}$ . If there is a transition of Open following s, then the injection

(w.r.t. stage action) is also satisfied. Therefore, on the next state and the second next state (the state after the stage body operation) in  $\rho'$ ,  $\kappa$  is also satisfied.

The conservative completeness is proved by contradiction. Assume there is a conservative run  $\rho$  in  $TS_{AP}$  that is not a run of  $InjTS_{AP}$ . Then in case the  $s_k = s_k'$  and  $t_k = t_k'$  but  $s_{k+1} \neq s_{k+1}'$  in runs of  $TS_{AP}$  and  $InjTS_{AP}$ , resp. Because all operations are deterministic, therefore it has to be  $s_{k+1} = s_{k+1}'$ . In case otherwise, (there is a state  $s_k$  in  $\rho$  s.t. all of the transitions enabled by the state cannot be enabled by the same state in  $InjTS_{AP}$ ), it is proved that for any stage body of the stage S that  $t_k$  is open stage operation of S, if  $t_k$  cannot be enabled in  $InjTS_{AP}$  by  $s_k$ ,  $\rho$  is either not sound or uses the reply event to update critical variables. In both cases, contradiction are witnessed. Therefore, conservative completeness is proved.

#### **Proof**

**Safeness** We prove injection safeness by induction. Let  $\rho' = s'_0 t'_0 \dots t'_{n-1} s'_n$  be a complete run of  $InjTS_{AP}$ , and without loosing generality, consider an arbitrary  $\kappa$  in **K**. Because in the initial state of  $InjTS_{AP}$  is the same as the initial state of  $TS_{AP}$ , the set of artifacts are empty, and in Equation (1) in [3], there is at least one artifact relation atoms in the premises of  $\kappa$ , therefore  $\kappa$  holds on  $s'_0$ . As induction hypothesis, suppose  $\kappa$  holds on state  $s'_k$  ( $0 \le k < n$ ). Only operations Body of some stage **S** and AchievClose of some milestone **m** can change the attribute value. If  $t'_k$  is not one of these two operations, then all constraints also hold on  $s_{k+1}$ . In case that  $t'_k$  is a Body operation of some stage **S**, since there can be at most one stage being active,  $SUB(\kappa, S[, aid])$  must hold on  $s_k$ , then after the assignment of SBody,  $\kappa$  also hold on  $s'_{k+1}$ . If  $t'_k$  is an AchievClose operation, then by Algorithm 1 in [3], it does not change the value of attributes in  $CA(\kappa)$  (otherwise, there will be no such  $t'_k$ ), therefore,  $\kappa$  also holds on  $s'_{k+1}$ . Therefore, safeness is established.

**Completeness** Assume there is a conservative run  $\rho$  that has no identical run  $\rho'$  in  $InjTS_{AP}$ , we prove contradiction. Because runs of  $TS_{AP}$  and  $InjTS_{AP}$  share the same initial state, without loosing generality, suppose run  $\rho'$  is the run of  $InjTS_{AP}$  that shares the longest common prefix with  $\rho$ , and let the maximal common prefix be  $s_0t_0 \dots t_{k-1}s_k$ , where  $k \geq 0$ . Then there are the following cases for the operations and states following  $s_k$ :

- 1. either there is no  $t'_k$  that can be enabled on  $s_k$ , or for any operations  $t'_k$  enabled by  $s_k$  in  $InjTS_{AP}$ ,  $t'_k$  and  $t_k$  are not of the same operation (with and without injection resp.): Because the injection is only made on Open operations, then such operation of  $t_k$  must be an Open(s [, aid]) operation for some stage s and optionally artifact id aid. Thus,
  - if the body of s is assignments, because  $\rho$  is safe, then  $t_{k+1}$  is operation Body(s, aid), and constraints in K hold on state  $s_{k+1}$ . The injection on s, Inj(s), is a conjunction of  $SUB(\kappa, s[,aid])$  for every constraint in K, then  $guard(t_k) \wedge Inj(s)$  holds on  $s_k$ , which leads to a contradiction that Open(s[,aid]) with injection is enabled on  $s_k$  in  $InjTS_{AP}$ ;
  - if the body of s is sending a one-way invocation or a reply, then operation Open(s[,aid]) is not injected, and therefore Open(s[,aid]) with injection is enabled on  $s_k$  in  $InjTS_{AP}$ ;
  - if the body of S is sending a two-way invocation, there must be a milestone triggered by the response. In case the milestone dose not use the response to set

any attributes in  $CA(\kappa)$  for any constraint  $\kappa \in \mathbf{K}$ , then  $Open(\mathbf{S}[,aid])$  operation is not injected and thus is enabled on state  $s_k$ . Otherwise, it is injected with FALSE and cannot be enabled. Thus  $\rho$  cannot be conservative.

Therefore, we witness contradictions.

2.  $t'_k$  and  $t_k$  are of the same operation (with and without injection resp.) but  $s'_{k+1} \neq s_{k+1}$ : Because  $\rho$  and  $\rho'$  share  $s_k$ , and all operations produces deterministic effect, then  $s_k$  must be the same of  $s'_k$ . We witness a contradiction.

In all of the cases we witness a contradiction. Therefore, for each conservative run  $\rho$  of  $TS_{AP}$ , there is be a complete run  $\rho'$  of  $InjTS_{AP}$  s.t.  $\rho$  and  $\rho'$  are identical.

# 4 Constraints and injection on EzMart

In this appendix section, we give the constraint formulas and the injection. Note that in the substitutions,  $id \circ newid()$  is further replaced by FALSE for any id unless  $\circ$  is  $\neq$  .; and  $x \circ null$  is further replaced by FALSE for any unless x is null or x is x is x is x in x

#### **Attribute constraint**

In Customer:

```
\forall custid, email, . . . • Customer(custid, email) \rightarrow email \neq "
```

The injection on *Open*(register) is

```
\texttt{TRUE} \rightarrow \texttt{regreq}.email \neq \texttt{``}
```

In Order:

```
\forall ordid, custid, invid, qty, . . . • Order(ordid, custid, invid, . . . , qty, . . . ) \rightarrow custid \neq null \land invid \neq null \land qty > 0
```

The injection on Open(create) is

```
\forall ordid, custid, invid, qty, . . . • TRUE \rightarrow (head cq).custid \neq null \land (head cq).invid \neq null \land (head cq).gty > 0
```

In Ship:

```
\forall shipid, ordid, addr, name, from, ship_stat.

Ship(shipid, ordid, addr, name, from, ship_stat) \rightarrow

ordid \neq null \land addr \neq null \land name \neq null \land from \neq null \land addr \neq from
```

The injection on *Open*(prepare) is

```
\forall shipid, ordid, addr, name, from, ship\_stat. \\ \text{TRUE} \rightarrow (head\ cq).ordid \neq \text{null}\ \land \\ Cutomer(Order((head\ cq).ordid).custid).addr \neq \text{null}\ \land \\ Cutomer(Order((head\ cq).ordid).custid).name \neq \text{null}\ \land \\ Inventory(Order((head\ cq).ordid).invid).loc \neq \text{null}\ \land \\ Cutomer(Order((head\ cq).ordid).custid).addr \neq \\ Inventory(Order((head\ cq).ordid).invid).loc \\ \end{aligned}
```

where head cq is a control event of paid<sup>+</sup>.

In Inventory:

```
\forall invid, loc, \dots Inventory(invid, ..., avail_qty, ...) \rightarrow loc \neq null
```

The injection on *Open*(inv\_initiate) is

TRUE 
$$\rightarrow$$
 (head eq).loc  $\neq$  null

where *head eq* is a invInit event.

## Candidate key constraint

The constraint formula is:

```
\forall custid, email, custid', . . . • Customer(custid', email, . . .) \wedge Customer(custid', email, . . .) \rightarrow custid = custid'
```

The injection on *Open*(register) is

```
\forall custid', \dots \cdot Customer(custid', (head eq).email, \dots) \rightarrow FALSE
```

where *head eq* is a regreq event.

#### Foreign key constraint

There is foreign key reference from *Order* to *Customer*, *Order* to *Ship*, *Order* to *Inventory* and *Ship* to *Order*.

In Order:

```
\forall \mathit{ordid}, \mathit{custid}, \mathit{invid}, \dots \bullet \mathit{Order}(\mathit{ordid}, \mathit{custid}, \mathit{invid}, \dots) \rightarrow \\ \exists \dots \bullet \mathit{Customer}(\mathit{custid}, \dots) \land \mathit{Inventory}(\mathit{invid}, \dots) \\ \forall \mathit{ordid}, \mathit{shipid}, \dots \bullet \mathit{Order}(\mathit{ordid}, \dots, \mathit{shipid}, \dots) \land \mathit{shipid} \neq \mathsf{null} \rightarrow \\ \exists \dots \bullet \mathit{Ship}(\mathit{shipid}, \dots)
```

The injection on *Open*(create) is

```
TRUE \rightarrow \exists \dots • Customer((head eq).custid,...) \land Inventory((head eq).invid,...)
```

where *head eq* is a checkout event.

The injection on *Open*(ship, *shipid*) is (*shipid* of *Order* is set in ship of *Ship*)

```
\forall ordid, \dots Ship(shipid, ordid, \dots) \land Order(ordid, shipid, \dots) \land shipid \neq null \rightarrow \exists \dots Ship(shipid, \dots)
```

Obviously, this results in TRUE.

In Ship:

```
\forall shipid, ordid, . . . . Ship(shipid, ordid, . . . ) \rightarrow \exists . . . . Order(ordid, . . . )
```

The injection on *Open*(prepare) is

TRUE 
$$\rightarrow \exists \dots \bullet Order((head cq).getid(),\dots)$$

where head cq is a paid<sup>+</sup> event.

#### Ship-order reference circle

It is actually two constraints:

```
\forall ordid_1, ordid_2, shipid, \dots
Order(ordid_1, \dots, shipid, \dots) \land Ship(shipid, ordid_2, \dots) \rightarrow ordid_1 = ordid_2
\forall shipid_1, shipid_2, ordid, \dots
Order(ordid, \dots, shipid_1, \dots) \land Ship(shipid_2, ordid, \dots) \rightarrow shipid_1 = shipid_2
```

The injection on *Open*(create) is

```
\forall \mathit{ordid}_2, \dots • \mathit{Ship}(\mathsf{null}, \mathit{ordid}_2, \dots) \rightarrow \mathsf{FALSE}
\forall \mathit{shipid}_2 • \mathsf{FALSE} \rightarrow \mathsf{null} = \mathit{shipid}_2
```

The injection on *Open*(prepare) is

```
\forall ordid_1, shipid, \dots \bullet Order(ordid_1, \dots, shipid, \dots) \rightarrow ordid_1 = (head\ cq).getid() \ \forall\ shipid_1, shipid_2, ordid, \dots \bullet Order(ordid, \dots, shipid_1, \dots) \rightarrow FALSE
```

where head cq is a paid<sup>+</sup> event.

The injection on *Open*(ship, *shipid*) is

```
\forall ordid_1, ordid_2, shipid, \dots
Order(ordid_1, \dots, shipid, \dots) \land Ship(shipid, ordid_2, \dots) \land Ship(shipid, ordid_1, \dots) \rightarrow ordid_1 = ordid_2
\forall shipid_1, shipid_2, ordid, \dots
Order(ordid, \dots, shipid_1, \dots) \land Ship(shipid, ordid, \dots) \rightarrow shipid_1 = shipid
```

#### Address-name constraint

```
The constraint is
```

```
\forall ordid, custid, shipid, addr_c, name_c, addr_s, name_s... • Order(ordid, custid, shipid,...) \land Customer(custid,..., addr_c, name_c...) \land Ship(shipid, ordid, addr_s, name_s) \rightarrow addr_c = addr_s \land name_c = name_s
```

#### The injection on *Open*register is

```
\forall shipid, addr<sub>s</sub>, name<sub>s</sub> . . . . FALSE \land Ship(shipid, ordid, addr<sub>s</sub>, name<sub>s</sub>) \rightarrow regreq.addr = addr<sub>s</sub> \land regreq.name = name<sub>s</sub>
```

## The injection on *Open*(create) is

```
\forall \ addr_c, name_c, addr_s, name_s \dots
Customer((head\ cq).custid, \dots, addr_c, name_c, \dots) \land FALSE \rightarrow addr_c = addr_s \land name_c = name_s
```

## The injection on *Open*(prepare) is

```
\forall ordid, custid, addr<sub>c</sub>, name<sub>c</sub>, . . . . FALSE \land Customer(custid, ordid, addr<sub>c</sub>, name<sub>c</sub>, . . . ) \rightarrow addr<sub>c</sub> = Customer(Order((head cq).getid()).custid).addr \land name<sub>c</sub> = Customer(Order((head cq).getid()).custid).name
```

## The injection on *Open*(ship, *shipid*) is

```
\forall ordid, custid, addr_c, name_c, addr_s, name_s... • Order(ordid, custid, shipid, ...) \land Customer(custid, ..., addr_c, name_c, ...) \land Ship(shipid, ordid, addr_s, name_s) \rightarrow addr_c = addr_s \land name_c = name_s
```

# **Ship-from constraint**

The constraint formula is

```
\forall ordid, shipid, invid, loc, from, . . . Order(ordid, . . ., invid, shipid, . . .) \land Ship(shipid, . . ., from, . . .) \land Inventory(invid, . . ., loc, . . .) \rightarrow loc = from
```

The injection on *Open*(create) is

```
\forall from, loc \dots

FALSE \land Inventory((head cq).invid, ..., loc, ...) \rightarrow

loc = from
```

#### The injection on *Open*(prepare) is

```
\forall ordid, invid, loc, \dots • FALSE \land Ship(shipid, ..., Inventorty(Order((head cq).getid()).invid).loc, ...) \land Inventory(invid, ..., loc, \dots) \rightarrow loc = Inventorty(Order((head cq).getid()).invid).loc
```

```
The injection on Open(ship, shipid) is
```

```
\forall ordid, invid, loc, from, . . . • Order(ordid, . . . , invid, shipid, . . . ) \land Ship(shipid, ordid, from, . . . ) \land Inventory(invid, . . . , loc, . . . ) \rightarrow loc = from
```

#### **Status constraint**

The constraint formula is

```
\forall ordid, shipid, ord_stat, ship_stat • Order(ordid, ..., shipid, ..., ord_stat) \land Ship(shipid, ordid, ..., ship_stat) \land ship_stat \neq FINISH \land ship_stat \neq FAILED \rightarrow ord_stat \neq RETURN \land ord_stat \neq CANCEL
```

The injection on *Open*(create) is

```
\forall ship_stat • FALSE \land ship_stat \neq FINISH \land ship_stat \neq FAILED \rightarrow CREATE \neq RETURN \land CREATE \neq CANCEL
```

The injection on *Open*(prepare) is

```
\forall ordid, ord_stat, ship_stat • FALSE \land PREPAR \neq FINISH \land PREPAR \neq FAILED \rightarrow ord_stat \neq RETURN \land ord_stat \neq CANCEL
```

The injection on *Open*(ship, *shipid*) is

```
\forall ord_stat, ship_stat • Order(ordid, ..., shipid, ..., ord_stat) \land Ship(shipid, ordid, ..., ship_stat) \land SHIPIN \neq FINISH \land SHIPIN \neq FAILED \rightarrow ord_stat \neq RETURN \land ord_stat \neq CANCEL
```

The injection on *Open*(sell, *invid*) is

```
\forall ordid, ship_stat • Order(ordid, ..., invid, , shipid, ..., ord_stat) \land Ship(shipid, ordid, ..., ship_stat) \land ship_stat \neq FINISH \land ship_stat \neq FAILED \land Inventory(invid, ...) \rightarrow INVUPD \neq RETURN \land INVUPD \neq CANCEL
```

The injection on *Open*(further\_action) is FALSE.

## References

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